NON-BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A THEORETICAL LEGAL STUDY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2195/2026/1.131-13Keywords:
non-biological intelligence, artificial intelligence, legal personality, quasi-subject of civil law, delictual liability, digital peculium, legal fiction, sui generisAbstract
Background. Civil law is facing an ontological crisis driven by the rapid development of autonomous algorithmic systems. The use of the anthropocentric term "artificial intelligence" is outdated, as it a priori categorises emergent machine systems as objects, precluding the adequate regulation of their autonomous agency and resolving the issue of delictual liability. This article aims to justify the dogmatic and terminological shift from the concept of "artificial intelligence" to "non-biological intelligence" (NBI) and to develop a theoretical and legal model for granting autonomous systems the special status of quasi-subjects in civil law.
Methods. The research relies on a comprehensive synthesis of general scientific and specific legal approaches. The philosophical-legal method was used to deconstruct the concept of "artificiality". The historical-legal method was employed for a retrospective analysis of the evolution of legal personality. The formal-dogmatic method facilitated the development of mechanisms for integrating NBI into the current civil turnover system.
Results. The study demonstrates that biological nature has historically never been the exclusive criterion for acquiring legal personality. It is established that the category of "non-biological intelligence" is substrate-neutral, enabling the recognition of the legally significant functional agency of algorithms without the need for anthropomorphisation. The article proposes establishing NBI legal status as a 'quasi-subject'. To eliminate the "accountability vacuum" in delictual liability, a concept of NBI's property liability has been developed through the mechanism of a "digital peculium". Furthermore, the study justifies the application of a sui generis regime to intellectual property objects generated by NBI, entirely excluding personal non-property rights.
Conclusions. The shift in the ontological and terminological paradigm from AI to NBI is a necessary precondition for the effective regulation of digital relations. The recognition of NBI's functional quasi-subjecthood does not confer human rights; rather, it establishes a pragmatic legal mechanism for risk management. The article provides an original definition of NBI and proposes reforms to civil legislation. This approach ensures the institutionalisation of a solvent and accountable participant in legal relations, maintaining a balance between fostering innovation and protecting public interests.
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